2023年1月2日 星期一

藏天下於天下

鯤鵬之化


2022DSE中文閱讀卷中,文言文引用了莊子《大宗師》中「藏天下於天下」之一段,被譽為「史上最難的DSE文言文」。引文如下:

死生,命也,其有夜旦之常,天也。人之有所不得與,皆物之情也。

泉涸,魚相與處於陸,相呴以溼,相濡以沫,不如相忘於江湖。與其譽堯而非桀,不如兩忘而化其道。

夫大塊載我以形,勞我以生,佚我以老,息我以死。故善吾生者,乃所以善吾死也。

夫藏舟於壑,藏山於澤,謂之固矣。然而夜半有力者負之而走,昧者不知也。藏小大有宜*,猶有所遯。若夫藏天下於天下,而不得所遯,是恆物之大情也。

*:這裡不用考試局的「藏小於大有宜」,而用原文「藏小大有宜」。

本文旨在詮釋「藏天下於天下」的哲學涵義。試譯為白話後,我會根據我對莊子思想之理解道出「藏天下於天下」的兩層意義:(1) 無所謂「失去」,(2) 萬物為一,兩忘而化其道。由於我認為「泉涸」「與其譽堯而非桀」一段和「藏天下於天下」沒有直接關聯,本文不會對這段詳解。

 

1. 引文試譯

生死乃必然,它們像日夜交替般平常。人總有不如意,這是事物之實情。

湖乾了,魚困在地上。牠們與其互相吐水維持生命,不如在江湖中忘記水的存在。與其讚譽堯而咒罵桀,不如忘了兩者而融入「道」之中。

大地賦予我形體,以生命使我勞動,以年老使我安佚,以死亡使我休息。所以安於生命的人,也安於死亡。

把船藏於山中,再把山藏於湖澤之中,可謂非常穩固了。但晚上如有力士把它背走,愚蠢的人不會知道。把小物藏於大容器內是合宜的,但也有失去的可能。若果把天下藏於天下,就不會失去了,這是永恒的萬物之實情。

 

2. 「藏天下於天下」的第一層意義:無所謂「失去」

上面講到「把天下藏於天下,就不會失去」,為甚麼?我們通常把東西藏在容器內,將其遮蔽起來,以防被人取走。但是如何「藏天下」呢?「天下」包括一切,沒有更大的容器可以藏起天下;但反過來,也因無人能藏起天下,不會有人能把天下取走。

然而,「藏天下」有何意思?我們如想擁有一個東西,就會藏起它。但莊子告訴我們,無論藏得多好,也有可能失去;事實上隨時間流逝,一切必將失去*。史上擁有最多的君王,死了也會失去一切;再偉大的帝國也會消亡。所以,如果我們不想失去,只要擁有天下就行了!而「藏天下」也只有「於天下」了。

*: 一說《大宗師》的「有力者」是指時間

然而,不擁有人和物,只「擁有天下」,這和沒有擁有又有何分別?這樣的「擁有」有誰稀罕?這可在莊子的其他著作中找到答案,齊物論》如此說道 :

非彼無我,非我無所取。是亦近矣,而不知其所為使。

如果沒有「非我」的觀念,就沒有「我」的觀念了。所以說「我擁有X」,就是把我和X區分開來。但「我」和「非我」也有相似之處(如二者都由物質構成),為何要如此區分?莊子認為,一切區分都是始於世俗的言語、知識和由此而來的既有觀念,這些區分都是任意和虛妄的。

如果沒有「我」和「非我」,也就沒有「擁有」,天下只是天下,是渾而為一的;沒有「擁有」,也就無所謂「失去」。「藏天下於天下」的道理,不是教人如何不會失去,而是使「失去」變成沒有意義。

 

3. 莊子的「道」和「化」

要明白莊子「萬物為一」和「兩忘而化其道」的意思,必須先了解莊子的「道」和「化」。

3.1 

莊子在大宗師》寫道:

夫道,有情有信,無為無形;可傳而不可受,可得而不可見;自本自根,未有天地,自古以固存;神鬼神帝,生天生地;在太極之先而不為高,在六極之下而不為深;先天地生而不為久,長於上古而不為老。

道是無形的,自有永有,存在於世上任何一個地方和事物之中。(《知北遊》說道在「屎溺」)「道」是一種幾近自然規律的,形而上的存在,它主宰萬物之流變,其本身卻沒有意志和好惡。萬物跟隨道的流變,就是所謂「化」。

 

3.2 

《至樂》中說到莊子的妻子之死:

莊子妻死,惠子弔之,莊子則方箕踞鼓盆而歌。惠子曰:「與人居長子,老身死,不哭亦足矣,又鼓盆而歌,不亦甚乎!」

莊子曰:「不然。是其始死也,我獨何能無概然!察其始而本無生,非徒無生也,而本無形,非徒無形也,而本無氣。雜乎芒芴之間#,變而有氣,氣變而有形,形變而有生,今又變而之死,是相與為春秋冬夏四時行也。人且偃然寢於巨室,而我噭噭然隨而哭之,自以為不通乎命,故止也。」

#:有和無之間

人誕生之前,本來是沒有形體和生命的物質。全因為道之所行,人才由「氣」聚成形體和有生命;而也因為道之所行,人才會死亡和腐化,歸於天地,這就像四時變化一樣,周而復始。人和天地一樣,都只是在順乎道的規律下變化。莊子又說:

道無終始,物有死生,不恃其成;一虛一滿,不位乎其形。年不可舉,時不可止;消息盈虛,終則有始。是所以語大義之方,論萬物之理也。物之生也若驟若馳,無動而不變,無時而不移。何為乎?何不為乎?夫固將自化。

《秋水》

道是永恒的存在,無始無終,沒有任何東西能阻止。萬物卻有生死、盈虛和始終,它們無一時固定,它們自己不斷都在隨時間變化。

 

4. 「藏天下於天下」的第二層意義:萬物為一,兩忘而化其道

4.1 萬物為一

上面提到《齊物論》中莊子破除「我」和「非我」之分別。在同一章他也借公孫龍「指非指」和「白馬非馬」的詭辯說明他自己的道理:

以指喻指之非指,不若以非指喻指之非指也;以馬喻馬之非馬,不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地,一指也;萬物,一馬也

齊物論》

《德充符》又道:

自其異者視之,肝膽楚越也;自其同者視之,萬物皆一也。

「(手)指」與「非指」之分,「馬」與「非馬」之分,是言語和知識帶給我們的概念,是虛妄的,所以必然是充滿邏輯上的缺陷。萬物皆有相同、相異之處,這些異同不構成分辨他們之理據;「指」和「馬」本和世上其他東西都相似,一切皆可渾為一體。

這也適用於「我」和天地之關係:

天地與我並生,而萬物與我為一。《齊物論》

不是「我」是天地之一部份,而是萬物本身就是一個不可分割的整體,而「我」只是後來由言語和知識所建立的概念。

 

4.2 兩忘而化其道

如果萬物為一,那麼,「藏天下於天下」是怎樣的一個人生境界?

上面我們看到,莊子於妻死時「噭噭然隨而哭之,自以為不通乎命,故止也。」(《至樂》莊子因妻死而傷心,但反省自己的哀傷是因為不了解「人必順應萬物流變而有生死」之道理,因此停止了哭泣。

莊子盆鼓而歌,不是因為快樂,而是展現了一種通達超脫之情懷。人與萬物同為一體,所謂「生死」只是天地循「道之所行」之自然而然的變化。而認為有「得失」,則是因為由知識和經驗產生之偏執,進而產生的錯覺。《至樂》另一段又說:

滑介叔曰:「亡。予何惡?生者,假借也;假之而生生者,塵垢也。死生為晝夜。且吾與子觀化而化及我,我又何惡焉?」

生命不過是物質湊合而暫時「假借」而來,生死如晝夜更替般平常。如果明白這道理的話,又怎會厭惡天地給我們的身體和事物呢?所以安於生命的人,也必安於死亡。

莊子利用「藏天下於天下」的道理,道出世上本無所謂得失,而這進一步是因為「萬物為一」,而有此覺悟者,可擺脫世俗灌輸給我們的種種偏執,不稀罕「擁有」,從由「得失」而來的恐懼中解放出來,樂於融入「道」的大同之中。這種心靈上的轉化,是順應自然,效法道的變化。

 

5. 結語

莊子善於用表面荒誕的故事和道理,讓人突破常識中理所當然的觀念,此中包括「我」、「非我」和「得失」。「藏天下於天下」表面非常荒謬,然而細思之下,人知道任何東西終歸都會失去,只有「天下」才不可能丟失。這知識看來十分無用,但若人了解「我」、「非我」和天下是一體的話,就會知道無所謂「失去」。人可從對「得失」的恐懼中被釋放出來。我們進而可以物我兩忘,從精神層面上自我轉化,融入「道」的運行之中。

 

2022年11月14日 星期一

非物質的靈魂存在嗎?

 「靈魂」是人類其中一個最久遠的概念。

它似乎解釋了許多東西:人的同一性(personal identity),以及智慧和意識之來源。

而物質如何產生意識,更是迄今科學未能解決,連頭緒也沒有的難題。

然而,儘管幾百年來的努力,現代科學並沒有找到靈魂存在的確鑿證據。

如果說靈魂是「超自然」的,是否就解決了這問題?

以下是我在讀哲學碩士「科學與理性思考」課程時,期末論文的一部份的答案。

 


 

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Question:

3. What are the major arguments for and against mind-body dualism? What impacts does the development of neuroscience have on the traditional view of mind? Do you think that it is reasonable to believe in the existence of an immaterial soul? Why or why not?

 

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Q3:   (Immaterial soul and mind) 

In this essay, I will focus on the discussion of interactionist substance dualism, which posits the existence of a physical world and immaterial soul (“soul” hereafter), and the two can interact. It is because (1) this form of mind-body dualism is the most popular, and (2) other forms of dualism (e. g. property dualism and epiphenomenalism) do not contradict with physicalism as much as the dualism I will write about.

Since most people believe in the existence of a physical world, I shall also use the arguments for and against the existence of soul, as those for and against dualism, respectively.

 

1.   Arguments for immaterial soul

 

       1.1   Mental-physical distinction

                  Philosopher Frank Jackson proposed a thought experiment: how “red” feels like is irreducible to knowledge about the physical world. [1] To many, the “soul hypothesis” has a crucial function to explain mental phenomena. Humans and some animals are very different from other entities: we have the abilities to perceive, remember, be self-conscious, think and have intention.

                 Plants and dead matters do not seem to share those. They are governed only by the blind physical laws of the universe which we can study openly. On the contrary, it seems that we each have the “privileged access” of our own mental content.

                 There seems to have an insurmountable gap between the mental and the physical, therefore it seems reasonable to theorize something other than the physical entities, which we call the “soul”, which is the bearer of the mental qualities.

 

 

       1.2   Personal Identity

                  There are also philosophical problems of what a person is, and how we can recognize if two persons are the same (e. g. a boy and an old man, at different times). Many theories are proposed, e. g. the body and psychological continuity criteria; but they are all unsatisfactory. Some suggested to give up the idea of person altogether. [2][3]

                 But the idea of personal identity is so natural and important to us: personal relationships, responsibility and ownership all depend on it. This problem has motivated some of us to believe in the existence of soul. Because a soul is immaterial, it cannot be divided; if every soul is unique and permanent, then we can distinguish two persons by their souls.

 

 

2.   Arguments against immaterial soul

 

       2.1   Problems of Interaction

                  The soul hypothesis has caused many conceptual problems. Soul is non-physical and thus very different from physical objects. If so, how can souls cause the changes in the physical human body? On the other hand, how do the stimuli caused by the external world on the physical body can possibly affect and be perceived by the immaterial soul?

                  Some people claim that they have seen ghost figures, or say that ghosts can scare or harm people. However, if these “ghosts” are non-physical souls, then how can they be seen? Being immaterial, they cannot interact with light to see people either. Philosopher Daniel Dennett said the idea of ghost is self-contradictory: sometimes they can pass through walls, but at other time they can move objects. [5]

 

 

       2.2   Incompatibility with science

 

                 The problem of interaction was just one of the many conflicts between the idea of soul and modern science.

                 Physics: In science, all events are physical, and any event is caused by a previous event in accordance to physical laws. Soul by definition is not physical, and therefore if it interacts with the physical world (e. g. a person raising her hand), there would be events not caused by other physical events. This violates the causal closure principle of physics.

 

                 Even if the soul can somehow cause physical events, there is still a scientific problem. Physicist Sean Carroll wrote that if there is any “spirit particles/ forces”, we would have already detected it. [6] If there is an event without a physical cause, it may also break the law of conservation of energy.

                 Neuroscience: Much has been known about how the brain works since the idea of soul. It is well-known that many physical alterations to brain can change the mental qualities we attribute to soul. These includes brain damage, tumor, psychiatric disorder, memory loss, electrical and magnetic stimulations, pharmacological and optogenetic manipulations, resulting in memory loss, change in perceptions, beliefs and personality. Neuroscientist David Eagleman described a patient with pedophilic tendency increases over stages of brain cancer. [7] Libet’s experiment and other similar experiments suggest that “our decisions” form in the brain before we “decide” them. [4]

                 If we can correlate all mental activities with regions of the brain, how can we still say that we must need a soul to account for the mental phenomena?

                 Since science has been so successful in explaining the natural world, it follows that if we have no strong reason to believe in soul, when science and the soul hypothesis are in conflict, we should abandon the latter.

 

 

3.   Possible responses

 

       3.1   Soul as an Explainer

 

                 In response to the problems of interaction, philosopher Richard Swinburne said our inability to understand how soul interacts with physical body does not mean they do not interact. [8] The mental-physical distinction is still very clear that we need soul to explain the mental phenomena as well as personal identity.

                 This line of thinking is analogous to the use of the idea of immaterial “vital force” to explain how dead matter can constitute living things. Nowadays, scientists generally agree that organisms emerge out of the complex arrangements of molecules and the chemical reactions among them. “Vital force” plays no part in this scheme, because it is not needed: we have known enough about organisms. Biologist Julian Huxley jokingly compared vital force to “locomotive force” which makes the vehicles move. [9] Similarly, the soul hypothesis may one day play no part in our explanation of mental phenomena.

                 Furthermore, the soul does not seem to explain personal identity satisfactorily. For if souls are immaterial, that they do not occupy spatial location, how can we distinguish one soul from another? There is also the problem of counting the number of souls: e. g. consider two persons, each with half of a brain; if the half-brains are put into the same body, is there one soul or two souls? [3] It seems that the concept of personal identity is one which is helpful to us in daily social situations instead of imaginary cases. It is erroneous to infer an immaterial entity from a confusing concept.

 

 

       3.2   Incompatibility with Science

                  Soul theorists, if not dismissing a large part of science, may respond to the disagreements between their hypothesis and science in the following ways.

                  First, altering brain structures and activities may seem to change the mental activities. However, we may compare the relationship between a brain and a soul, with that between a violin and its player. If the violin is broken, the bad play may not be due to the skill of the violinist; similarly, the alteration of the brain does not imply that of the soul. [10]

                  Second, some may distinguish mind from soul, with the mind being physical and responsible for the mental phenomena. Soul does not directly interferes with the physical world through the mind, thus is not in conflict with any physical laws or the results of neuroscience.

                  These auxiliary theories may indeed avoid the conflicts between science and the soul hypothesis, however with bad consequences. For they take away the explanatory power of the soul, which was once the main reason of the soul hypothesis. Soul has become something without any function or effect. If everything can be explained through the physical events, by Occam’s Razor we have no need of the presupposition of a soul.

 

In conclusion, because of the (1) incompatibility between the soul hypothesis and science, (2) problems of interaction between soul and physical objects, and (3) failure of the soul hypothesis in explaining personal identity, there is no rational reason to belief in immaterial soul and therefore mind-body dualism.

 

Reference:

  

[1]     Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.

 

[2]     Parfit, D. (1971). Personal identity. The Philosophical Review, 80(1), 3-27.

 

[3]     Parfit, Derek. “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons” in Edwards, Paul (Ed.). Immortality. Prometheus. 1997, pp. 308-315.

 

[4]     Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1993). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). In Neurophysiology of Consciousness (pp. 249-268). Birkhäuser, Boston, MA.

 

[5]     Dennett, Daniel. Conciousness Explained. Back Bay Books. 1992.

 

[6]     Carroll, S. M. (2011, May 23). Physics and the Immortality of the Soul. Retrieved from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/

 

[7]     Choi, C. (n.d.). Brain tumour causes uncontrollable paedophilia. Retrieved from https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2943-brain-tumour-causes-uncontrollable-paedophilia/

 

[8]     Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford University Press. 1997.

 

[9]     Gillies, Mary Ann. (1996). Henri Bergson and British Modernism (revision of author’s PhD thesis), (pg. 31). McGill-Queen’s Press.

 

[10]   Calef, S. (n.d.). Dualism and Mind | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/